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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model for designing the pricing policies for the supply chain whose channel is integrated with
retail and e-tail. In order to incentive the retailer, the manufacture in the supply chain adopts return policy promising
that any unsold product can be returned to the manufacture for a partial refund in the end of the selling season. How can
the manufacture coordinate the pricing policy between the retail and e-tail channel and what is the optimal pricing
policy for the wholesale price and return policy which will make the supply chain’s profit maximize are the central
issue in the supply chain coordination. Pricing policies between retail and e-tail are researched under the Stackelberg
price competition model firstly. Under the optimal competing pricing policies model, we further obtain the equilibrium
pricing for the wholesale and return price that make the supply chain maximize through the expected profit analysis.
Then further research dimensions are discussed in the end of the paper.
Keywords: pricing policy, supply chain, profit, electronic commerce
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, rapid developments in information
and telecommunication technology have substantially
changed the landscape of organizational computing.
Electronic
commerce
(E-commerce),
including
Web-based commerce, mobile commerce (M-commerce)
and ubiquitous commerce (U-commerce), is based not
only on developments pertaining to the Internet
compound, but also on prior technological and
organizational innovations arising from the combination
of telecommunications and organizational computing[1].
As the most rapidly developing, e-commerce via the
Internet (i.e., Web-based commerce) has substantially
affected the business world since the commercialization
of the internet and evolution of the dot.com in the early
1990’ and it is commonly believe that the transactions
volume via e-commerce will continue to grow in the
coming years[2]. Different companies have different uses
of the e-marketplace and different e-marketplaces take
different roles. There is an increasingly number of
company which takes e-marketplace as a distribution
way which named as e-tail. By this way, many
companies, such as dangdang.com in china, seems to
make success possible. However, in most case, it turn out
that the most workable solution is the way that is
integrated with e-tail channel and traditional retail ones.
By this hybrid channel, customer can have more than one
way to purchase commodity by their attitude or
convenience.
With the development of e-commerce, e-tail become as a
crucial retail way in distribution channel more and more
in practice and there is an increasingly number of
research paper that is focus on the distribution channel
which is integrated with e-tail and retail. For example,
Dong-Qing and John J study the equilibrium pricing
policy under the e-commerce [3]. Tsen-Ming Cha
studied the return policy in supply which is integrated

with e-marketplace [4]; Chen and Siems discusses the
relationship
between
the
B2B
e-marketplace
announcements and the shareholders response in the
financial market [5]; Chiang studied the dual channel
supply chain design for goods that do not provide a large
service (value) such as books, CDs, etc. their results
show the manufacturer can mitigate the profit loss by
adding a direct channel [6]. Besides these researches,
Iyer examined how manufacturers should coordinate
distribution channels when two retailers compete under
price and non-price attributes in supply chain earlier [7].
This paper focuses on providing an analytical pricing
model for using both e-marketplace and retail as
distribution channels in a supply chain instead of
proposing a conceptual framework. We study a supply
chain which is integrated by a return policy and the
manufacture can distribute products by directly “on-line”
(by e-Marketplace, referred to as e-tail) and traditional
channel by which the manufacture wholesale the
products to the retailer. Although, the mix of distribution
with e-Marketplace has added a new dimension of
competition to the firm’s distribution channels, the
manufacture faced with the problem how to design the
pricing policy in the e-tail and regular retail channels in
order to coordinate the distribution channels. Also the
manufacture must decide the wholesales price and the
returned price before the selling season in order to
maximize mutual profit for manufacture and retailer. In
fact, the analysis of return policy for channel
coordination has been studied by Pasternack in the paper
Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable
commodities which published in the marketing science
literature in 1985 [8]. However, Pasternack’s study
didn’t consider the impact of e-commerce on the
commodities distribution because there is no
e-commerce experience in that time. Cha study the
optimal return policy under two undisturbed market [4].
Also, Hon-Shiang Lau studies the manufacture’s pricing
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policy strategy and return policy for a single-period
commodities in which the retail channel didn’t integrate
with e-marketplace [9]. However, with the emergency
of e-commerce, more and more manufacture integrates
e-marketplace as the aid way to distribute their products
[10], such as gome in china. And the manufacture in
supply chain is faced with the new problem how to
coordinate the pricing policy among different
distribution channels.
In this paper, we assume a two-echelon supply chain
with a single manufacturer who supplies a single item to
the retailer and the manufacture adopts both e-tail and
regular retail channels to distribute products. Both the
channels are designed for different customers
respectively and the customer can acquire value-added
service by regular retail channel which cannot receive
from the e-tail channel; however, the price attached to
e-tail would be lower. Under different types of retail
channels and service level, what are the equilibrium
pricing policies that manufacture should adopt for the
e-tail and retail channels in order to coordinate the sales
quantity and the profit in different channels? We will
examine the pricing equilibriums between the e-tail
channel and retail channel under the types of competitive
pricing schemes: Stackelberg competition models. Under
the Stackelberg model, the manufacture, as the leader of
the market, announce the e-tail price before the selling
season firstly. Also, the manufacture has considered the
retailer’s reaction prior to announce the e-tail price. As
the follower in the market, the retailer reacts to the e-tail
price by choosing retail price and the corresponding
service level to maximize its own selling quantities and
the profit.
As a result, we obtain the equilibrium prices between
e-tail and retail channels. Because of promising in
contracts, the retailer can return any unsold products to
the manufacture for a partial re-fund products after the
selling seasons which can incentive the retailer to order
more quantities products and work harder for retailing,
by this way, the manufacture shares the risk caused by
demand uncertainly with the retailer by this way. Also,
the retailer can acquire reasonable profit by different
order quantity and the retail price. After we study the
competing pricing policy between the e-tail and retail
channels under the Stackelberg competing model before
the selling season, the equilibrium pricing policy for
wholesale price and return price is studied in the paper
which can coordinate the profit and risk between the
manufacture and retailer.
On the basis of the discussion, the paper is organized as
follows: the quantity model that the supply chain is
integrated with retail and e-tail channel is set up in
section 2, and the Stackelberg competing pricing model
is presented in successions; as a result, we obtain optimal
pricing policy pertain to e-tail and retail channels under
the discussion on the model. Furthermore, we derive the
expected profits for all the parties in the supply chain
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under the wholesales price and returns policy in section2.
After deducing, the optimal pricing policy for the
wholesale price and returns policy is proposed in the
same section. In the end, concluding remarks are
presented.
2. MODEL
Based on the above discussion, we consider a supply
chain inside which a single-product manufacturer-retailer
system mixed with an e-tail distribution channel in
addition to a regular retail channel where the
manufacture sells the product to a retailer at a fixed
market with a unit wholesale price of w0 and the unit
production cost at the manufacture is c . The retailer then
sells the product to the customers in the lower echelon
with price p2 . In the past, the manufacture can only
distribute items by this way. However, with the
development of e-commerce, the manufacture can select
an e-tail channel to sell the products directly on-line at
the same time in which the price is p1 . At the same time,
the retailer competes against the on-line selling by
adding value service via the traditional channel when
distribute the product to lower echelon at a retail price p2 .
The cost which is produced by value-added service
defined as c ( v ) , such as speciously packing for books
and CDs or properly maintain service for cars which are
needed for some customers who are assumed to be
heterogeneous and are able to purchase a product either
from a retail channel or directly from an e-tail channel
and some of the them would like to purchase directly
from the manufacturer at a lower cost, while others are
willing to pay more for the value added by the retailer
that are unavailable in e-tail, on the contrary. Because of
the value-added service, the retail price p2 is typically
expected to be higher than e-tail price p1 .
After the selling season the retailer can return any unsold
products to the manufacture under the returns policy on
the price w1 which is promised in the contracts, so the
manufacture shares the risk caused by demand
uncertainly with the retailer by this way. As we
discussed above, the retailer can acquire reasonable
profit by different order quantity and the retail price p2
either. In this paper, we assumed that the manufacture
can sell any returned products by the e-marketplace
faced with global and local markets and whose demand
is assumed to be immensity. In the past, without the
e-commerce, the manufacture would salvage the returned
products at a price µ that more lower than p1 . However,
any unsold products cost the retailer a unit holding
cost h . In the past, there is an example of using both
e-tail and traditional retail in china, such as eguo.com.
In this paper, we assume all information is common to
both parties which mean that the retailer has complete
information about manufacture (such as unit production
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cost, etc) and vice verse. With the above details, Fig 1
shows the structure of the supply chain with the use of
the e-tail.

DISTRIBUTOR

d 2 = D 2 ( p1 , p2 ,v ) = ( a2 − bp2 ) + γ v + λ ( p1 + v − p2 ) (5)

Return

Where ai is the market base through channel i ( i = 1
for e-tail and i = 2 for retail), bi represents the
marginal channel demand per respective channel price,
and γ measures the marginal retail demand per retail
service value added. The parameter λ , termed discussion
intensity, is adopted to describe the shift between the two
channels with regards to the price and value.

E-tail

Retail

POTENTIAL
CONSUMER

= p1 D1 ( p1 , p2 ,v ) + ( p2 − c ( v ) ) D2 ( p1 , p2 ,v )

(3)
We define the e-tail channel demands d1 and retail
demands d 2 as following which are similar to that in
Tsay etal [11] and Choi [12]:
(4)
d1 = D1 ( p1 , p2 ,v ) = ( a1 − bp1 ) + λ ( p2 − v − p1 )

MANUFACTURER

Supply

π ( p1 , p2 ) = π 1 + π 2

POTENTIAL
CONSUMER

We assume that before the selling seasons both the retail
and the manufacture expect that the entire product q
will be sold by either e-tail or retail, which will make
their profit be maximized. Under this consideration, we
can formulate the Stackelberg pricing equilibrium of p1
and p2 . In the competing pricing model, we assumed that
after the manufacture announced the e-tail price p1 the
best-reaction price that the retailer would adopt to
maximize its profit is p2 which make the following
equation satisfy:
p2 ( p1 ) = arg max π 2 ( p1 , p2 )
(6)

Fig.1. a supply chain mixed with e-tail and retail
Firstly, we have the following notation
π 1 Profit of the manufacture;
π 2 Profit of the retailer;
π Profit of the supply chain;
d1 Demand via e-tail channel;
d 2 Demand via retail channel;
p1 Unite price of the e-tail channel;

p2

Anticipating against price p2 that would be adopted by
the retailer, the manufacture will select the best e-tail
price p1 , which is given as:

p2 Unite price of the retail channel;
w0 Unite wholesale price of the product;
w1 Unite return price for the unsold product
v Cost of unit value-added service
q Quantity of product retail ordered from
manufacture;

Under the Stackelberg model, the manufacture, as the
market leader, firstly announced the unit e-tail price p1
to maximize payoff π 1 on consideration the expect
reaction price before the selling season; as the follower
of the market, the retailer then reacts to the
manufacture’s price policy p1 by adopting unit price
p2 and value-added service which unite cost is v to
maximize its market share and own profit π 2 .
So we can define the profit for manufacture, retailer and
the supply chain as following:
π 1 ( p1 , p2 ) = p1 D1 ( p1 , p2 ,v ) + wD2 ( p1 , p2 ,v )
(1)

π 2 ( p1 , p2 ) = ( p2 − c ( v ) − w ) D2 ( p1 , p2 ,w )

(2)

max π 1 ( p1 , p2 ( p1 ) ) = p1 d1 + wd 2
p1

(7)

Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to p1 and
let ∂π ∂p1 = 0 yields:
p1 =

2a1b + 2a1λ + a2 λ + vγλ + c ( v ) bλ
4 ( b + λ ) − 2λ 2
2

+

c ( v ) λ 2 + 2wbλ + 2wλ 2 − vλ 2 − wvbλ

4 ( b + λ ) − 2λ 2
As the same way, we can obtain:
λ p1 + a2 + ( λ + γ ) v + ( c ( v ) + w ) ( b + λ )
p2 =
2 (b + λ )

(8)

2

(9)

p1 And p2 is the competing equilibrium price that the
manufacture and retailer decide by Stackelberg model
before the selling seasons, which would make their profit
maximize. Under the equilibrium pricing policy, they
will contract the wholesale price w0 and return price
w1 in order to share profit and risk in the cooperation
process, So we define the π r1 , π r2 , π r as the real profit
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for manufacture, retail and supply chain end the selling
season. Then we discussion the optimal wholesale price
w0 and return price w1 in the following.
End the selling season, profit for the manufacture,
retailer and supply chain are defined as following:
π r1 = ( w0 − c ) q − ( w1 − p1 ) L
(10)

π r2 = ( p2 − w0 ) q − ( p2 + h+c ( v ) − w1 ) L

(11)

π r = π r1 + π r2 = ( p2 − c ) q − ( p2 + c ( v ) +h − p1 ) L

(12)

Where L shown the amount of returned items after the
retail selling season and it is defined as:
L = max ( 0,q-x )
(13)
From the equation (10), (11) and (12), we can formulate
the expect profit for the manufacture, retailer and supply
chain as:
E [π r1 ] = ( w0 − c ) q − ( p2 + h − p1 ) E [ L ]
(14)

E [π r2 ] = ( p2 − w0 ) q − ( p2 + h+c ( v ) − w1 ) E [ L ]

(15)

E [π r ] = ( p2 − c ) q − ( p2 + h+c ( v ) − p1 ) E [ L ]

(16)

The expected returned products shown as following:

E [ L ] = ∫ ( q − x ) f ( x ) dx
q

(17)

0

Taking the derivative of (15) (16) with respect to q , we
can show the result of the optimal product quantities for
retailer and supply chain as:
dE [π r2 ]
dE [ L ]
= ( p2 − w0 ) − ( p2 + h + c ( v ) − w1 )
(18)
dq
dq
dE [π r ]

= ( p2 − c ) q − ( p2 + h + c ( v ) − p1 )

dE [ L ]
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3. CONCLUSION
This paper shows how a monopolistic manufacture of a
single-period commodity could establish his pricing
policies in a mixed e-tail and retail distribution channel
in the supply chain under the e-commerce environment，
in which the manufacture and retailer consider not only
the wholesale price and return price, but also the
competitive equilibrium pricing policy between the e-tail
and retail firstly which we demonstrate by Stackelberg
competition model. Also we obtained dynamic
equilibrium equation between the optimal wholesale
price and return price, which can make the supply
chain’s profit maximize and serve as a way for the
manufacture and the retailer sharing the profit and the
market risk.
In order to simplifier, we assumed that all returned
product would be sold entirely by e-marketplace in this
paper. However, as an extension, we can research the
condition in which the returned products are still left in
the e-tail in the end, which will make the research more
complex. Also, we can also discuss the manufacture and
the retailer announces the price simultaneity, so the price
equilibrium can not be received by Stackelberg
competition model. In more generally, we may further
study equilibrium prices for different demand forms
contrary to the linear demand which is assumed in this
paper. Further study could be done how the incentive
plan can be set to coordinate the manufacture and the
retailer to make more contribution to the supply chain.
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(19)

dq
dq
Let (18) (19) equal to zero, we can acquire the optimal
product quantities respectively for retailer and supply
chain. It is obviously that there is only one solution for
the optimal quantities in the supply chain. So we can
obtain equation (20) from equation (18) (19) which are
shown as:
⎛
⎞
p2 − c
⎜⎜
⎟⎟ w1 − w0
⎝ p2 + h + c ( v ) − p1 ⎠
⎛
⎞
⎛
⎞
p2 − c
= ⎜ ( p2 + h ) ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ − p2 ⎟⎟
⎜
⎝ p2 + h + c ( v ) − p1 ⎠
⎝
⎠
(20)

The manufacture and the retailer have decided price p1
and p2 before the selling season, which we have
explained by Stackelberg competing model shown in (8)
and (9). From the equation (20), we can find that the
wholesale price w0 and return price w1 are the
variable which can the manufacture use as the way to
share the profit and risk with retailer by different
wholesale price w0 and return price w1 . In order to
make the profit of the supply chain maximize, price w0
and w1 must satisfy the equation (20).
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